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Abstract
In a programmatic article Alfred Eichner explained, from a Post Keynesian
perspective, why neoclassical economics is not yet a science. This was some
time ago and one would expect that Post Keynesianism, with a heightened
awareness of scientific standards, has done much better than alternative
approaches in the meantime. There is wide agreement that this is not the case.
Explanations, though, differ widely. The present – strictly formal – inquiry
identifies an elementary logical flaw. This strengthens the argument that the
Post Keynesian motto ‘it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong!’
is methodologically indefensible.
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To anticipate the bottom line of Eichner’s (1983) rephrased adumbration: Post
Keynesianism is not yet a science because of a lack of logical rigor. This is not
to say that Keynes’s theory is ‘false’ in the naive factual or political sense. Post
Keynesians rightly claim that Keynesianism is closer to the facts than general
equilibrium theory and this is recognized by some Post Walrasians.
I consider that Keynes had no real grasp of formal economic theorizing
(and also disliked it), and that he consequently left many gaping holes
in his theory. I none the less hold that his insights were several orders
more profound and realistic than those of his recent critics. (Hahn,
1982, pp. x-xi)
The Keynesian Revolution was intended as both, a radical change of economic
policy and a groundbreaking paradigm shift. Keynes pursued two goals (Moggridge,
1976, pp. 29-36). That, of course, is perfectly legitimate, but it complicates things
somewhat.
However much economists may evoke their purity, they want to change
the world. They want to contribute to the solution of urgent practical
problems. ... Of course, they also pursue the consistency of the
theories they make, for he who contradicts himself proves nothing.
(Klant, 1988, pp. 112-113), original emphasis
The crucial point is to set the priorities right. The consistency of theory comes
first. An inconsistent theory is on equal footing with a pamphlet. Needless to
emphasize that consistency, the ‘hobgoblin of little minds’ (Veblen), is rarely the
chief criterion of theory choice. There is no difference on this score between
Laissez-faire, Keynesianism, Marxism or Heterodox Economics in general. What
is accepted in the political arena is ‘the implied ethical message of the doctrine
rather than the doctrine’ (Gerschenkron, 1969, p. 13). In the following neither the
ethical message nor the political usefulness of Post Keynesianism is at issue. The
focus is on Keynes pivotal message.
Keynes . . . believed that he could logically demonstrate why "Say’s
Law . . . is not the true law relating the aggregate demand and supply
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functions" when we model an economy possessing real world charac-
teristics; and until we get our theory to accurately mirror and apply
to the "facts of experience," there is little hope of getting our policies
right. That message is just as relevant today. (Davidson, 1984, p. 561),
original emphasis
Here we are on common ground – but then it takes little more than ten pages to
backpedal from ‘accurately’ to ‘roughly’.
For Keynes as for Post Keynesians the guiding motto is "it is better to
be roughly right than precisely wrong!" (Davidson, 1984, p. 574), see
also (Colander, 1995, p. 283) for Marshall’s maxim
If we define the ambition of science as to get it precisely right, then the guiding
motto of Post Keynesianism amounts to an invitation of ‘Babylonian incoherent
babble’ (cf. Dow, 2005, p. 385) and leads, predictably, to a loss of theoretical
coherence (King, 2002, pp. 203-208). The obvious logical crux of the motto is
that there is no scientific criterion to decide between ‘roughly right’ and ‘roughly
wrong’. Roughly right presupposes that one knows already what is right. In this
case: why bother with the second best?
It is worth to recall how Keynes announced his scientific revolution and thereby
set the task.
The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-
Euclidean world who, discovering that in experience straight lines
apparently parallel often meet, rebuke the lines for not keeping straight
– as the only remedy for the unfortunate collisions which are occurring.
Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw over the axiom of par-
allels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar
is required to-day in economics. (Keynes, 1973, p. 16)
Davidson, for one, took up the task (e.g. 2011, 2010) but an agreed-upon set of
non-Euclidean axioms that defines the Post Keynesian hard core is still lacking.
Keynes’s formal groundwork consisted in the main of two equations (Y =C+ I,
S = Y –C; 1973, p. 63). That provisional (O’Donnell, 1997, p. 158) formal
basis is too small and contains quite a number of tacit assumptions. Taking this
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two equations as a point of departure, an alternative formal foundation is in the
following worked out because to gain full transparency about the basics is a sine
qua non.
This paper’s general thesis says that human behavior does not yield to the
axiomatic method (cf. Hudík, 2011; Rosenberg, 1980), yet the axiomatization of
the monetary economy’s fundamental structure is feasible. By choosing objective
structural relationships as axioms behavioral hypotheses are not ruled out. The
structural axiom set is likewise open to the optimization calculus and to Keynes’s
fundamental psychological laws (for details see 2011c).
The formal ground is prepared in Section 1. In Sections 2 and 3 profit, retained
profit and saving is defined in terms of the axiomatic variables. Then, in Section 4,
the business sector is differentiated. This yields the General Complementarity that
defines the relation between total profit, investment expenditure, household sector
saving and distributed profit. This relation is contrasted to Keynes’s limiting case
in Section 5. In the final part, Sections 6 to 8, it is demonstrated in detail how the
redundant definition of total private saving led to elementary logical flaws and how
the resulting inconsistencies have been papered over with loose verbal reasoning.
Section 9 concludes.
1 Axioms and definitions
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in
a period of arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is
conveniently assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have
at first one world economy, one firm, and one product. Axiomatization is about
ascertaining the minimum number of premises. Three suffice for the beginning.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income,
i.e. the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
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Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on an underlying production function. The 2nd
axiom should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment
expenditures, no foreign trade, and no taxes or any other state activity. Albeit quite
obvious, it is worth to emphasize that all axiomatic variables are measurable in
principle. No nonempirical concepts like utility, equilibrium, decreasing returns or
perfect competition are put into the premises.
A set of axioms cannot be assessed ex ante because the full range of implications
is not immediately evident, yet:
The contents can be disclosed completely by deduction. It then brings
nothing to light which had not already been contended in the composite
of axioms. (Klant, 1984, p. 25)
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms (Boylan and
O’Gorman, 2007, p. 431). With (4) wage income YW and distributed profit income
YD is defined:
YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t. (4)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical
context of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
The economic meaning is rather obvious for the set of structural axioms. What
deserves mention is that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and
distributed profit and not of wage income and profit. Profit and distributed profit
are quite different things that have to be thoroughly kept apart.
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2 Profit
The business sector’s financial profit in period t is defined with (5) as the dif-
ference between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with
consumption expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :1
Q≡C−YW |t. (5)
In explicit form, after the substitution of (3) and (4), this definition is identical
with that of the theory of the firm:
Q≡ PX−WL |t. (6)
Using the first axiom (1) and the definitions (4) one gets:
Q≡C−Y +YD |t. (7)
The three definitions are formally equivalent. If distributed profit YD is set to
zero in (1) then we have as the most elementary configuration Y = YW . For the
business sector as a whole to make a profit consumption expenditures C have in
the simplest possible case to be greater than wage income YW . So that profit comes
into existence in the pure consumption economy the household sector must run
a deficit at least in one period. This in turn makes the inclusion of the financial
sector mandatory (for details see 2011a). A theory that does not include at least one
bank that supports the concomitant credit expansion cannot capture the essential
features of the market economy (Keynes, 1973, p. 85). Since there is no capital in
the pure consumption economy profit cannot be attributed to it as factor income
(for details see 2012, Sec. 1.6). Mention should be made that neither Neoclassicals
nor Keynesians ever came to grips with profit (Desai, 2008, p. 10).
1 Profits from changes in the value of nonfinancial assets are neglected here, i.e. the condition of
market clearing O = X holds throughout. For details about changes of inventory see (2011d, p. 5).
Nonfinancial profit is treated at length in (2011b).
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3 Retained profit and saving
Profits can either be distributed or retained. If nothing is distributed, then profit
adds entirely to the financial wealth of the firm. Retained profit Qre is defined for
the business sector as a whole as the difference between profit and distributed profit
in period t:
Qre ≡ Q−YD ⇒ Qre ≡C−Y |t. (8)
Financial saving is given by (9) as the difference of income and consumption
expenditures. This definition is identical with Keynes’s (1973, p. 63).2
S≡ Y −C |t (9)
Financial saving (9) and retained profit (8) always move in opposite directions,
i.e. Qre ≡ −S. Let us call this the Special Complementarity. It asserts that the
complementary notion to saving is not investment but negative retained profit.
Positive retained profit is the complementary of dissaving. There is neither capital
nor inventory investment in the pure consumption economy. Therefore, there can
be no relation between saving and investment.
4 Precisely right
Having clarified the structural properties of the pure consumption economy we
are now ready to include investment expenditure. Based on the differentiated
formalism it is assumed that the investment goods industry, which consists of
one firm, produces OI = XI units of an investment good, which is bought by the
consumption goods industry to be used for the production of consumption goods
in future periods. The households buy but the output of the consumption goods
industry (for details see 2011e). From (6) then follows for the financial profit of
2 For the treatment of nonfinancial saving see (2011b, Sec. 2.1).
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the consumption and investment goods industry, respectively:
QC ≡C−YWC
QI ≡ I−YWI
|t. (10)
Total financial profit, defined as the sum of both industries, is then given by
the sum of consumption expenditure and investment expenditure minus wage
income which is here expressed, using (1), as the difference of total income minus
distributed profit:
Q≡C+ I− (Y −YD) with YW ≡ YWC +YWI |t. (11)
From this and the definition of financial saving (9) follows:
Q≡ I−S+YD |t. (12)
Higher total financial profits on the one side demand as a corollary, i.e. as
a logical implication of the definition itself, higher investment expenditure and
distributed profits and lower saving on the other side. By finally applying the
definition of retained profit (8) the General Complementarity follows:3
Qre ≡ I−S |t. (13)
If retained profit Qre is zero, that is, if profit and distributed profit happen to
be equal in (8), then, as a corollary, investment expenditure and household saving
in (13) must be equal too. Vice versa, if it happens that household saving is equal
to investment expenditure then, as a corollary, profit and distributed profit must
be equal too. In reality, though, profit and distributed profit are never equal and
correspondingly household saving and investment are not equal either. The fact
that retained profit is different from zero in the real world can be taken as an
3 This equation is not entirely new, see (Robinson, 1956, p. 402), (Lavoie, 1992, p. 159 eq. (4.3)),
(Allais, 1993, p. 69), (Godley and Lavoie, 2007, p. 37 fn. 9). But only Allais clearly stated the
implications: “Autrement dit l’investissement n’est pas égal à l’épargne spontanée, mais à l’épargne
spontanée augmenté du revenue non distribué des entreprises . . . ” Roughly: “In other words,
investment expenditure is not equal to spontaneous saving but to spontaneous saving augmented by
the business sector’s retained profit . . . ” This, though, made not much impact on the other side of
the language barrier.
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empirical proof of the logically equivalent inequality of household saving and
business investment. Allais has definitively settled the IS-debate of the 1930s in
1993. Since then, all models (including IS−LM) that have been built and are still
being built on the arguments of (Hicks, 1939, pp. 181-184), (Ohlin, 1937), (Lutz,
1938), (Lerner, 1938), (Keynes, 1973, p. 63), (Kalecki, 1987, p. 138), (Minsky,
2008, pp. 162-164) and others have to be regarded either as limiting cases or as
formally deficient.
5 Roughly right
When the profit definition for the pure consumption economy (i) in (14) and the
investment economy (ii) is compared
(i) Q≡ YD−S
(ii) Q≡ I +YD−S
|t (14)
the first point to emphasize is that definition (i) is consistently replaced by
the broader definition (ii). The inclusion of the investment process significantly
changes the scope of profit generation.
For definition (ii) the corollary (15) holds: if it happens that distributed profit is
zero then financial profit must be equal to the difference of investment expenditures
and household sector’s saving:
YD = 0⇔ Q = I−S |t. (15)
This implication of (ii) is well known as one of Keynes’s ‘fundamental equa-
tions for the value of money’ (Keynes, 1971, pp. 124, 136). This means that,
although Keynes was closer to the structural axioms in his Treatise than in his
General Theory, he nonetheless was not general there either. The reason is that
he did not accurately discriminate between profit and distributed profit and by
consequence failed to formally take into account the process of profit distribution
that is crucial for the functioning of the market system.
His [Keynes’s] Collected Writings show that he wrestled to solve the
Profit Puzzle up till the semi-final versions of his GT but in the end
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he gave up and discarded the draft chapter dealing with it. (Tómasson
and Bezemer, 2010, pp. 12-13, 16)
6 Precisely wrong
The formalism up to the General Complementarity (13) is composed of axioms
and definitions. In a strictly formal sense the definitions are dispensable. Any new
symbol (definiendum) that is introduced with a definition is an abbreviation for a
longer expression (definiens) that is composed of the variables of the axiom set and
the familiar mathematical operators. So, when the word processor is instructed to
replace one definiendum after another by its definiens then the equations become
longer yet nothing else changes.
Since it is true that everybody is free to define whatever appears to be appro-
priate it seems that a definition could not pose any real problem. This, indeed, is
not true because the full freedom of definition holds but for the first definition (cf.
Boland, 2003, p. 87; Hahn, 1984, p. 40).
Let us suppose somebody looks at the General Complementarity (13), which
states that retained profit for the economy as a whole is equal to the difference of
the business sector’s investment expenditure and the household sector’s saving,
and proposes to refer to the sum of saving and retained profit as total private
saving Σ because retained profit may, commonsensically, be regarded as saving of
the business sector (e.g. Lavoie, 1992, p. 159). Thereby a new definition, (i) in
(16), would be added to the already existing formalism. Together with the General
Complementarity (ii) this gives (iii) which states that total private saving Σ “equals”
investment.
(i) Σ≡ S+Qre (ii) Qre ≡ I−S ⇒ (iii) I ≡ Σ |t (16)
We thus arrive at an implicit definition that is no proper definition at all (Stigum,
1991, pp. 35-36). Equation (iii) in (16) is not a dispensable abbreviation but simply
permits the arbitrary permutation of the symbols Σ and I. It is clear from the
derivation of (iii) that it is an elementary formal mistake to define total private
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saving Σ and then to claim that I ≡ S is an accounting truism. If anything, then
I ≡ Σ is the truism. The difference seems subtle but it is real.
The practical implication of (16) is: Let I be 100 and S be 100 in (13) then
retained profit Qre is zero. Alternatively, let S be zero then retained profit is 100.
Economically, both configurations are as different as can be with regard to the
financing requirements of the business sector; according to (16) they are the same.
As a matter of fact, all feasible configurations are formally made to be the same
by (16). I ≡ Σ is like the broken clock that, however, is right twice a day.
Because, and this makes the refutation of (16) a bit circumstantial, if it happens
that retained profit is zero in (i) then, as a corollary, it must hold that total private
saving Σ and household saving S are equal, i.e. Σ = S. From (ii) then results as
a corollary I = S or in plain words: household sector’s saving equals investment
– if retained profit is zero, which never happens. In contrast, (iii) states that total
private saving Σ is identical with investment I by definition (cf. Samuelson and
Nordhaus, 1998, p. 204 and p. 194 for corporate saving).4
A complete resolution of this formally unacceptable state of affairs requires
that the wrong turnoff (i) in (16) is not taken. This definition implicitly leads to
(iii) which signals redundancy. Redundancy calls for Occam’s razor.
Under the purely formal perspective the salient point is: in a system of equations
x = y signifies a condition that is satisfied by certain values of the unknowns; in
a system of definitions x≡ y signifies a dead end or, in Keynes’s words, a ‘blind
manipulation of symbols.’ The expression x≡ y allows replacing the word apple
wherever it appears by the word orange, and vice versa. From this, no profound
insights are to be expected.
Under the conceptual perspective the salient point is: saving as the complement
of consumption expenditure refers exclusively to the household sector.
It is true, of course, that neoclassical economists also consider total
private saving, defined as the sum of personal and business saving,
since the distinction between households and firms is often treated
as a veil and individual agents are assumed to optimize total private
4 From the 1948 edition onwards, Samuelson never came to grips with profits (Tómasson and
Bezemer, 2010, p. 16-17).
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(rather than merely household) saving. (Gordon, 1995, p. 62), original
emphasis
Yes indeed, neoclassicals are talking nonsense, but a paradigm shift is supposed
to overcome the flaws of the obsolete paradigm and not to repeat them (Eichner
and Kregel, 1975, p. 1301). There is no such thing as saving of the business
sector. Ultimately, the saving-equals-investment formula results in superficial
empirical studies (Gordon, 1995, pp. 60-62) and unacceptable conventions in
national accounting (cf. Eisner, 1995, p. 109; Godley and Lavoie, 2007, pp.
260-263; Kakarot-Handtke 2012).
Conceptual consistency prohibits the application of the notion of saving to
the business sector. The compelling reason for rejecting the definition of total
private saving Σ in (16), and everything that follows from it, boils down to that
it is conceptually inadmissible, implicitly leads to I ≡ Σ, which signifies redun-
dancy, and for certain conditions to I = S, which is a limiting case of the General
Complementarity with no real world correspondence.
7 Never ex ante, never ex post
No matters were more discussed in the literature of the 1920s and early
1930s than the role of the market mechanisms in co-ordinating saving
and investment decisions and the consequences of their failure to do
so, . . . (Laidler, 1999, p. 325)
It did not got lost in the discussion that in fact investment expenditure might not be
equal to household saving and this was explained with the perfect reconcilability
of an ex ante disequilibrium with the ex post accounting truism I ≡ S (Myrdal,
1939, p. 47), which in turn is different from the equilibrium condition I = S. This
rationalization is beside the point for the simple reason that a meticulous recording
of all transactions during one period arrives at the General Complementarity (13)
which is the logical terminus of the analysis. Only after applying the indefensible
definition of total private saving Σ the national accountant will arrive at I ≡ Σ (with
Σ being different from S). These extra entries are formally redundant. The ex ante–
ex post interpretation, or, for that matter, the designed–undesigned interpretation
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(Heilbroner, 1942, p. 828) fits the prevailing mode of ‘loose verbal reasoning’
(Dennis, 1982, p. 698) that cares not much for conceptual consistency. All that is
necessary for an empirical proof is to add up the available numbers and to abstain
from redundant definitions.
8 Set and subset
Keynes’s characterization of the ‘nature of economic thinking’ (1973, p. 297) has
been summed up to: better vaguely right (ordinary discourse) than precisely wrong
(blind manipulation of symbols). This alternative does not exist, at least not in
science. Keynes recognized that without formal principles of thought ‘we shall be
lost in the wood’ and struggled in Book II with fundamental definitions and ideas
(Coates, 2007, pp. 82-91). He finally came up with equation (i?) (Dimand, 2010, p.
292), which follows from (11) as limiting case:
Axioms Definitions
(i) Y =WL+DN (iv) YW ≡WL
(ii) O = RL (v) YD ≡ DN
(iii) C = PX (vi) Q≡C−YW
(i?) Y =C+ I (vii) Qre ≡ Q−YD
if Q = YD (viii) S≡ Y −C
|t. (17)
The structural axiomatic approach rests on the three axioms (i)-(iii) that capture
the elementary facts of a monetary economy, and five definitions. It formally
reduces to Keynes’s limiting case (i?) and (viii) if profit is equal to distributed
profit (with Q = YD = 0 as the most limited case). This never happens in the real
world (Godley and Lavoie, 2007, p. 35).
Keynes’s main concern in the General Theory was not market or policy failure
but theory failure. By consequence he envisioned nothing less than a paradigm
shift (Coddington, 1976) and called for a ‘complete theory of a monetary economy’
(Keynes, 1973, p. 293), see also (Dillard, 2010). While perfectly aware that
this at the same time required a consistent set of some kind of non-Euclidean
axioms, Keynes had no desire that the particular forms of his ‘comparatively
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simple fundamental ideas . . . should be crystallized at the present state of the
debate’ (cited in Rotheim, 1981, p. 571). It is no undue rashness to make good for
the missing non-Euclidean axioms now.
9 Conclusion
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three non-behavioral axioms as groundwork for the
consistent reconstruction of Keynes’s formal foundations. The main results of this
endeavor are:
• The profit generating expenditure-income asymmetry is the indispensable
prerequisite for favorable business conditions and prolonged growth. This
holds for the elementary consumption economy and the complex investment
economy in equal measure.
• Models that are based on the collapsed definition total income ≡ wages +
profits are erroneous because profit and distributed profit is not the same
thing.
• Keynes proposed to ‘throw over’ the axioms of the orthodox theorists which
‘resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world’, but failed to heed
his own appeal. His own formal basis is too small, contains too many tacit
assumptions, and is not general.
• The Keynesian formalism is a subset of the structural axiom set. The General
Complementarity is confirmed. With regard to all I = S or I ≡ S models
it asserts that household saving is never equal to investment expenditure,
neither ex ante nor ex post. The standard ex ante–ex post explanation consists
of multiple logical errors that support one another.
The structural axiomatic approach solves the Profit Puzzle and fits Post Keynesian-
ism consistently into a general and open formal framework.
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